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I. INTRODUCTION
Questioning the juristic legitimacy of informalism and interna-
tional soft law is not new. Despite the prevailing skepticism, the hard
truth is that States and other actors on the international plane have
always involved various methods of supplementing and avoiding legal
obligations. The burgeoning ranks of stakeholders on the interna-
tional level need international regulation to provide a consistent
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framework on which to base their activities. Where the traditional
methods of international treaty-making have proven insufficiently ef-
ficient or up-to-date, recourse to informalism and soft law methods
has provided the panacea.
This is particularly clear in the field of international space law. In
the few years after the 1957 launch of Sputnik I shocked the world,
the international community quickly cobbled together treaty agree-
ments outlining the international obligations of States in relation to
activities in outer space. The early glory days of rapid treaty-making
quickly burnt out, however, with States choosing, from the 1980s, to
stop the lawmaking process at the stage of United Nations General
Assembly Resolutions instead. Recently, international space law-
making has "softened" further-with substantive progress made by
national agencies and professional experts through the drafting of
Codes of Conduct and Best Practices Guidelines-with no move to-
wards the adoption of another formal treaty. This in fact leaves inter-
national space law in quite a conundrum. Confronted with rapid
technical, economic and policy changes in the field, legal regulation of
space activities has not been able to keep pace.
The complexity of space activities has quickly outrun traditional
methods of lawmaking. This has led to the necessitation of action
from international organizations, specialized agencies, private bodies
and professional associations that do not nicely fit into the State-cen-
tric paradigm of international lawmaking. These actors appear to un-
dertake a "softly, softly, catchee monkey" approach-rather than
rocking the stable international space law boat, they are choosing in-
stead to focus on non-binding, non-treaty agreements. The motivation
behind this approach seems to be a belief that behavior and action at
the international level in space activities can be best influenced in a
non-confrontational, informal way. The informalism of this approach
has caused some controversy. The juristic value of informal non-
treaty agreements and their role in the international legal framework
have increasingly become issues that concern international space law.
This Article looks at the role of informalism and soft law in the
contemporary formation of international space law. It first considers
the theoretical issues related to informalism, and then looks at the
advantages and disadvantages associated with non-treaty agree-
ments. The practical usage of non-treaty agreements in international
space law is examined through the developments in the mitigation
and remediation of space debris, as well as in the prevention of the
weaponization of outer space. Proposals are made with regard to in-
formal non-treaty making, so as to offset the possible disadvantages of
informalism.
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II. INFORMALISM, SOFT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW
Myriad instruments delineating "soft" international agreements
have long been sources of scholastic and practical controversy. Propo-
nents of the supremacy of State consent have debated with those who
favor international regulation.' What divides scholars so sharply is
that this type of "law" is not among the sources of law listed in Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ Statute").2
This "leads us into difficult and controversial dogmatic terrain." 3
An amazingly varied tapestry of soft law instruments exists, 4 with
various degrees of differences in form, language, parties, objectives
and enforcement procedures. 5 Soft law includes binding instruments
that only comprise soft obligations, as well as non-binding instru-
ments that are accepted by States, international organizations and re-
gional arrangements. This Article will focus on instruments outlining
the commitments that States, international organizations and re-
gional arrangements enter into without concluding a formal, binding
treaty under international law. Hillgenberg termed these instru-
ments "non-treaty agreements,"6 a term that this Article will also use.
The crux of the concerns surrounding soft law involves the basic
tenets of international law-the principles of sovereignty and consent.
Continued debates relating to the definition, scope and role of soft
non-treaty agreements manifest the long-running feud between those
championing the overarching primacy of State consent and those who
assert that there should be limitations on State behavior in the inter-
est of international regulation. The positivist perspective stipulates
that international law derives solely from the will of sovereign
1. For an excellent review of the role of soft law in international regulation, see
generally Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal
System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE-THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21, 21 (Dinah Shelton ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2000).
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031
[hereinafter "ICJ Statute"].
3. Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 499, 499
(1999).
4. Together with the diversity of "soft law" instruments, there is also a plethora of
scholarly and academic articles on the topic. See generally Sz~kely, Non-binding
Commitments: A Commentary on the Softening of International Law Evidenced in
the Environmental Field, in INTERNATIONAL LAw ON THE EvE OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 173 (United Nations 1997); Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal
Norms: A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?, 11 NETHERLANDS
Y.B. INT'L L. 66 (1980); Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding
International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 300 (1977); Prosper Weil, Towards
Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983).
5. Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 850 (1989).
6. See Hillgenberg, supra note 3, at 500.
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States.7 Given that sovereign States are very unlikely to curtail their
own sovereignty unless such curtailment were in their interest, it is
not surprising that treaties are often long in the making, and face
much reluctance in signature, ratification or accession.
Cue the entry of soft law, non-treaty agreements. Comprising all
the functional aspects of the substantive discussions, without the legal
import of a binding treaty framework, these non-treaty agreements
are generally recorded in declarations or recommendations that evince
a workable compromise.8 It is precisely this dual-edged character-
being both "soft" and "law"9-that has given rise to the outcry, both
for and against, the employment of non-treaty agreements in interna-
tional law.
A. Interpreting Non-Treaty Agreements: Do they bind
parties?
Some scholars have entirely rejected the notion of international
regulation and law-making through such non-treaty agreements.' 0
These scholars have argued that the criteria listed in Article 38(1) of
the ICJ Statute, as have been applied by the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice in the Lotus case,"1 must be fulfilled in order to
ensure the formal legal validity of any instrument. As such, non-
treaty agreements cannot possibly add to the matrix of international
law, nor can they have any meaningful binding effect on parties. Yet,
it can be seen that both binding frameworks and the "substrata of
non-binding principles"12 have been incorporated into the means by
which normative standards of appropriate international action is
regulated.
As Chinkin points out, this is precisely the "inevitable paradox"
surrounding international non-treaty agreements.13 In the majority
of these cases, the adoption of an agreed compromise in a non-binding
format was a deliberate choice. It seems then, that the question as to
whether such agreements bind parties is moot-given that interna-
tional law is premised on the consent of sovereign States, the mere
fact that these States choose a non-binding arrangement must, in and
7. See ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 171 (1986).
8. A.J.P. Tammes, Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International
Law, 94 RECUEIL DES COuRs 261 (1958).
9. The term "soft law" was first coined by Lord McNair. See A.J.P. Tammes, Soft
Law, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE
ERADES 187 (1983).
10. See G. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1993); C. In-
gelse, Soft Law, 20 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 75 (1993); Jan Kiabbers, The Redundancy
of Soft Law, 65 NORDIc J. INT'L L. 167 (1996); Weil, supra note 4.
11. S.S "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
12. Chinkin, supra note 5, at 24.
13. Id. at 25.
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of itself, be evidence of the fact that such non-treaty agreements can-
not bind.
Or can they? Among the challenges facing the drafters of non-
treaty agreements are: What are the applicable rules for interpreta-
tion? Are there consequences upon non-fulfillment? How can dis-
putes relating to the agreement be settled? These questions lead to
the heart of the inquiry as to whether non-treaty agreements carry
legal force. The International Court of Justice, in the South West Af-
rica case, opined that it was not the Court's business "to pronounce on
political or moral duties."14 Similarly, what matters is whether obli-
gations in such agreements are legal-whether they carry binding
force.
One of the precepts of international law is that parties are free to
choose the design, form and content of agreements they enter into,
providedjus cogens norms are not violated. 15 Non-treaty agreements
are generally concluded when the parties want to ensure that there
would not be a breach of international law (with the corresponding
reprisal and compensatory consequences) in the case of non-fulfill-
ment. As mentioned above, the overarching intention of the parties
not to be bound therefore argues against the binding effect of such
agreements. 16
The interpretation of non-treaty agreements also takes cognizance
of two principles of international law: bona ides (good faith),17 and
venire contra factum proprium (estoppel).1s It may be argued that if
parties enter into agreements in good faith, and then act in reliance on
the rights and obligations enshrined in that agreement, the doctrine of
estoppel may prevent other parties from going back on their word.19
14. International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J 139 (Jul.
11).
15. Wilhelm Wengler, "Nichtrechtliche" Staatenvertrage in der Sicht der Volkerrechts
und des Verfassungsrechts, 23 JURISTENZEITUNG 21 (1995) (F.R.G.).
16. LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 6 (1961); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 581 (6th ed. 2003).
17. Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 6).
18. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 35 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (explaining the dichotomy between "detri-
mental reliance" and the "intention to create a binding obligation").
19. Estoppel has been regarded by many highly qualified publicists as a general prin-
ciple of international law, stemming from good faith and consistency. See Temple
of Preah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. 6, at 39-51, 60-65 (separate opinions of Judges Al-
faro and Fitzmaurice); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 168-72 (Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1958). It
must be noted that Brownlie cautions that estoppel should be used with great
care, as there is no particular coherence or source of estoppel as a principle in
international law. See Temple ofPreah Vihear, 1962 I.C.J. 6, at 143 (Spender, J.,
dissenting); BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 616 (citing inter alia Christian
Dominic6, A Propos du Principe de l'Estoppel en Droit des Gens, in RECUIEIL
D'8TUTDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 327, 364
2009]
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Further, when seen in the light of the supremacy of party intention,
there appears also no ground for denying parties the possibility to
make commitments with lesser legal consequences than a full-blown
treaty,20 especially where the parties' declared intentions coincide. 21
As such, non-treaty agreements can perhaps be considered binding on
other parties, if one party acts in good faith and in detrimental reli-
ance upon them.
The International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
case 22 appears to be moving away from a sterile application of inter-
pretation rules and towards a more complex view of party relations.
Without impinging on the dichotomy between binding and non-bind-
ing agreements in international law, there appears to be a gradated
scale of enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms that could
accrue to parties under international law.
Carrots are also used more often than sticks in non-treaty agree-
ments. It is an interesting point that in general, parties choose to com-
ply with non-treaty agreements. 23 Ultimately, whether or not a party
abides by any imposed obligation, whether it is legally binding or oth-
erwise, depends almost entirely on the party's intentions and will.
Enshrining an obligation on the altar of a treaty framework does no
more to ensure compliance where there is no intention to comply.2 4
Conversely, simply because an obligation is not couched in treaty
terms does not mean that parties are less willing to comply. In the
horizontal system of international law, instruments, laws and regula-
tions that engage political will are those that will be complied with.
(1968) (Switz.); ANTOINE MARTIN, L'ESTOPPEL EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC(A. Pedone, ed. 1979). The present author is of the view that estoppel operates as
a basic principle of the law where there has been detrimental reliance in the case.
This position has also been taken up by the International Court of Justice in its
decisions in: North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 3, 26 (Feb. 20); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246,309 (Oct. 12); Arbitral Award Made by
the King of Spain (Hond. v. Nicar.), 160 I.C.J. 192, 213 (Nov. 18).
20. Hillgenberg, supra note 3, at 506. This is not to say that there is a sliding scale of
legal commitment-either an agreement is legally binding or it is not. However,
the consequences for non-fulfilment may be different in each of the cases. Id. at
507.
21. Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 42, at 115 (Oct. 15).
22. International Court of Justice: Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcfkovo-
Nagymaros Project, 37 I.L.M. 162 (1997).
23. See generally Hiram Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of De-
clarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L. J. 87 (1991); Harold Koh, A World
Transformed, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. ix (1995).
24. For an excellent discourse on compliance with hard law and soft law instruments,
see R.R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INr'L & COMP.
L.Q. 549 (1980).
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This is no different in the case of non-treaty agreements. 25 In fact, the
multifaceted versatility of informal non-treaty agreements may pro-
vide a way through which the international community can escape the
stilted exclusivity of creating law only through treaty-making.
B. Yea- and Naysayers to Non-Treaty Agreements
Given the quagmire of complexity and criticism that generally ac-
companies non-treaty agreements, their continued widespread usage
may seem perplexing. Yet there are good reasons for their use, 2 6 espe-
cially in the field of space activities. These include the following:
a Non-treaty agreements constitute a versatile prg-droit regime that
can galvanize developments in the field.
A non-treaty agreement may be a necessary step on the ladder to-
wards a "hard" legal regime such as a treaty framework. As aware-
ness, acceptance and application of the standards enunciated by the
non-treaty agreement increases, the obligations become more "hard."
This flexible, preliminary framework gives impetus to further legal
development in the field. An excellent illustration is the Declaration
of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, 27 unanimously adopted by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly on December 13, 1963. This early, non-binding
resolution laid the groundwork for the standards that would later find
expression in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. 28
* Non-treaty agreements are good mutual confidence-building
measures.
Informal non-treaty agreements have proved to be effective confi-
dence-building measures. Aside from providing a possibility for talks
between potential competitors and antagonists, the informality of non-
treaty agreements also allows for "soft" obligations to be enunciated.
These, in turn, have ensured the inclusion of capacity building and
technology transfer provisions, generally on a mutually acceptable ba-
sis. The 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of all
25. See Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International
Politics, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLAWALE 135 (Elias E Bello &
B.A. Ajibola, eds. 1992).
26. Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35
INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 787 (1986).
27. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1962
(Dec. 13, 1963).
28. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter "Outer
Space Treaty"]. As of January 1, 2008, ninty-eight States have ratified the
Treaty, and an additional twenty-seven States have signed it.
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States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Coun-
tries 29 is a sterling example in international space law of a confidence-
building non-treaty instrument.
* Simpler negotiating and finalization procedures allow the frame-
work to be more rapidly put in place.
Without long treaty conferences and ratification procedures, the
simpler negotiation and finalization processes of non-treaty instru-
ments may prove more efficient. Parties are more likely to haggle
over a potentially binding document than a "soft law" instrument, and
this may also slow the process down. In fields where rapid evolution
of the law is necessary due to circumstantial changes-such as in the
protection of the environment, and in the rapidly evolving arena of
space activities-the rapidity with which non-treaty agreements can
be concluded is a definite advantage.
* Non-treaty agreements contribute toward the formation of cus-
tomary international law.
The International Court of Justice opined in obiter in the Continen-
tal Shelf cases that evidence of the formation of customary interna-
tional law can be found through subsequent State practice and opinio
juris.30 Non-treaty agreements do not, of themselves, constitute cus-
tomary international law. 3 1 However, where a non-treaty agreement
has been consistently acted upon-such as where States Parties incor-
porate obligations accrued under non-treaty agreements into their do-
mestic legislation-this may also be taken as evidence of State
practice and opinio juris for the formation of customary international
law.32
A clear example in international space law can be found in Princi-
ple XII of the 1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth
from Outer Space. 33 Principle XII safeguards the right of non-dis-
criminatory access by sensed States to remote sensing data over their
territory at reasonable cost price. The 1986 Principles were passed by
consensus at the United Nations General Assembly and are, therefore,
not binding. However, with the subsequent State practice complying
with this obligation, 3 4 and its incorporation in many national laws
29. G.A. Res. 51/122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/122 (Dec. 13, 1996).
30. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1984 I.C.J. 3 (Mar. 21).
31. Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enter-
prises, in STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, VOLUME 1: LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (Norbert
Horn, ed. 1980).
32. Id.
33. G.A. Res. 41/65, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986).
34. Patrick A. Salin, Les Contrats Landsat de Thldtection signds par les agences
spatiales amdricaines avec les stations-sol gtrangres: Evolution depuis les con-
trats expdrimentaux de la NASA aux contrats commerciaux d'EOSAT, 38 AN-
NUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE [ANN. FR. DROIT INT'L] 998 (1992).
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governing remote sensing licenses,35 the obligation enshrined in Prin-
ciple XII is considered by many leading scholars to have entered into
customary international law.36
- A premature formal treaty agreement is prone to a high risk of
failure.
In most fields of international law, treaty regimes are established
ex post facto to regulate or remedy circumstances that, in many cases,
already exist. This is markedly not the case in international space
law, where international treaties tend to be concluded preemptively-
prior to the actual situation that necessitates such regulation. Inter-
national space law has already borne witness to the fact that a negoti-
ated treaty, even when opened for signature, can still fail
spectacularly. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 37 with its dismal 13 ratifica-
tions and 4 signatures, none from any major space-faring nation, is
the case in point. Now the focal point of arguments as to why treaty
regimes for space law are not viable, the Moon Agreement, though a
treaty, has less in the credibility stakes than, for example, the 1986
Remote Sensing Principles or the 1992 Nuclear Power Sources Princi-
ples, both of which are "soft," non-binding General Assembly resolu-
tions. In some cases, the political fallout of a failed treaty is more
damaging on the field of law than a "soft" regime that is perceived to
be successful.
- A larger breadth of parties can be accommodated with non-treaty
agreements.
One of the disadvantages to many treaties negotiated and con-
cluded under the United Nations system is the narrow breadth of lo-
cus standi afforded to potential parties. 38 These treaties address
almost exclusively States Parties, with more enlightened regimes per-
haps offering accession possibilities for international intergovernmen-
tal organizations, 3 9 and observer status for non-governmental
35. For examples of such national legislation, see United Nations Office for Outer
Space Affairs, National Space Law Database, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/
SpaceLaw/national/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
36. Vladimir Kopal, The Role of the United Nations Declarations of Principles in the
Progressive Development of Space Law, 16 J. SPACE L. 15 (1998).
37. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979) [hereinafter "Moon Agreement"]. This Agreement
applies mainly to other planetary and celestial bodies other than the Earth, but
may be seen to further international obligations towards the protection of the
space environment, and therefore strengthening provisions for the mitigation
and remediation of space debris. As of January 1, 2008, thirteen States have
ratified the Agreement, and four States have signed it.
38. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 449.
39. See generally C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICA-
TION, 185-224 (1964) (Article XIII of the Outer Space Treaty also makes its provi-
2009]
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organizations. 40 In today's global political economy, this framework is
hopelessly outdated. In particular, actors on the global level today
range from individuals to States, multinational corporations, grass-
roots, regional and international non-governmental entities, transna-
tional organizations and international intergovernmental agencies.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of space exploration
and applications. 4 1 It is essential that the varied actors are given the
possibility of locus standi where necessary, as well as dispute settle-
ment procedures that take their diverse interests and characteristics
into account. 42 The possibility to achieve this is greater with non-
treaty agreements, traditionally already meant for actors outside of
the category of States.
0 Non-treaty agreements are more adaptable to rapid changes in
the field.
Given their informality, non-treaty agreements provide the possi-
bility to efficiently and effectively respond to ambient changes in the
field in question. Non-treaty agreements meld international regula-
tion over high-risk space activities while maintaining adaptability to
retain their relevance in evolving situations. An example of this can
in particular be seen with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,
which are discussed in the next Part.4 3
Naysayers point to three very convincing arguments that informal-
ism and non-treaty agreements have a negative impact on the law.
These include:
" Non-treaty agreements are not binding and cannot be enforced;
* The negotiation process through consensus may not be simpler
or more efficient; and
* Non-treaty agreements may contribute to the incoherence and
fragmentation of the international legal system.
It is true that non-treaty agreements are not binding, and there-
fore ultimately would face serious problems with enforcement. How-
ever, treaty and non-treaty agreements have historically enjoyed
sions applicable to activities in outer space carried on by international
intergovernmental organizations.).
40. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS") grants ob-
server status to, for example, the European Space Agency ("ESA") and to INTER-
SPUTNIK. Other UN treaty frameworks that grant observer statuses to
international intergovernmental organizations include the 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity and the World Trade Organization.
41. See G~rardine M. Goh, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
139-91 (2007).
42. Id.
43. See infra Part III.A.
[Vol. 87:725
SOFTLY, SOFTLY CATCHEE MONKEY
largely the same compliance rates.4 4 In the case of international
space law, thus far no issue has arisen that has defied either a peace-
ful settlement of the dispute, or a direct breach of an obligation with
no consequence, whether that obligation is hard or soft. To date,
therefore, the first concern has not affected space law.
The second concern is of a greater import. The timeframe of nego-
tiations before the adoption of a substantive United Nations General
Assembly Resolution on activities in outer space ranges from any-
where between six and twenty years.4 5 This is a significant finding,
especially when contrasted with the establishment of the regime
under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which took all of nine years for its
negotiation, drafting, opening for signature and entry into force. 4 6 It
must be noted however, that the Outer Space Treaty was based on an
earlier U.N. General Assembly Resolution,4 7 and its quick conclusion
was fueled in part by the political and technical circumstances of the
day. However, as will be seen in the next Part, it remains true that
the negotiation process, which must generally reach consensus, is not
necessarily simpler or more efficient than that needed for a full-blown
treaty regime. A more efficient finalization of the agreement is more a
function of the political will and circumstantial requirements than of
the "softness" or otherwise of the final agreement.
The third imputation is perhaps the most significant. Non-treaty
agreements tend to be negotiated in various fora, amongst various ac-
tors, and generally almost simultaneously as issues become impor-
tant. At best, this could lead to an overlap in recommendatory
guidelines; at worst, conflicting international standards may emerge.
Without a common forum for stakeholders to convene, the diverse dis-
cussions could lead to a clear fragmentation of the international legal
order through incoherence and conflicting standards. This is espe-
cially the case in areas where a clear black-or-white obligation is nec-
essary as opposed to a minimum standard. For example, the
prevention of the weaponization of outer space and the preservation of
outer space for peaceful purposes is an unequivocal obligation.4S It is
important especially in this area not to have conflicting views from
non-treaty agreements among various groups of stakeholders. On the
other hand, standards for safety assurance in human spaceflight, for
44. WOLFGANG HEUSEL, WEICHES VOLKERRECHT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE UNTER-
SUCHUNG TYPISCHER ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN 306 (1991).
45. This is the time lapse between the initiation of discussions at the U.N. COPUOS.
Six years elapsed between the launch of Sputnik I in 1957 and the 1963 Declara-
tion; much more time was necessary for the negotiations in the COPUOS to coa-
lesce into U.N. G.A. Resolutions on other issues relating to space activities.
46. See generally N. JASENTULIYANA & R.S.K. LEE, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, VOLUMES
I AND 11 (1979).
47. See supra note 27.
48. See infra Part III.B.
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example, may take the "minimum standard" approach.49 Neverthe-
less, it is submitted that some procedural and substantive rules for
soft-lawmaking through the conclusion of non-treaty agreements
should be put in place.5O The establishment of these rules is urgent,
especially considering that informalism and non-treaty agreements
are making significant inroads in the regulation of activities in outer
space.
III. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING: INFORMALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
Practically speaking, informalism is well and thriving in various
aspects of the development of international space law. From the over-
arching framework proposed for space traffic management and situa-
tional awareness, to the charter developed for disaster management
and emergency response, the movement to informalism is gaining
ground.
A fascinating trend of note is the increased participation of techni-
cians and scientists in the legal regulation of space activities, either in
international fora or through academic and professional associations.
The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has in recent years become more
actively involved in the formulation, for example, of space debris miti-
gation guidelines. Various Study Groups of the International Acad-
emy of Astronautics have also been engaged in the study of the
feasibility of space traffic management regimes, legal-medical liability
and regulation of commercial human spaceflight and the space debris
situation. Moreover, highly specialized professional associations have
been established in the recent years to address specific areas of inter-
est in space activities. A good example of this is the formation of the
International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety51-a
professional association of engineering, technical, scientific and legal
practitioners in the field with the objective of establishing safety stan-
dards for both manned and un-manned spaceflight. This Part will
briefly look at two areas in which informalism has allowed the pro-
mulgation of international legal standards for various fields of space
activities:
* Space Debris Mitigation and Re-mediation; and
* Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space.
49. G~radine M. Goh, Securing Safety: Standards for the Mass Commercial Spacef-
light Market, Paper presented at the 59th International Astronautical Congress
(2008).
50. See infra Part IV.
51. For information on the International Association for the Advancement of Space
Safety, see http://www.iaass.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
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A. Space Debris Mitigation and Re-mediation
One of the main threats to the outer space environment is orbital
debris. 52 The direct imposition of legal obligations for protection of
the outer space environment through the mitigation and re-mediation
of space debris situation necessitates the passage of a binding interna-
tional treaty framework. Issues that must be dealt with include: State
responsibility, liability, cost-sharing, scheduling, enforcement and
verification measures, and dispute settlement mechanisms. The
treaty should also be ratified by all space-faring States. Needless to
say, given these parameters, this is not likely to happen in the foresee-
able future.53
Legal provision for the protection of the outer space environment is
very minimal within the existing body of international space law. 54
The framework of U.N. treaties dealing with activities in outer space
was adopted before environmental protection came to the forefront of
international legal regulation. Thus, the U.N. space treaties do not
take cognizance of the developments made by international environ-
mental law in the last twenty years. Although general principles for
the protection of the outer space environment are enunciated in the
1967 Outer Space Treaty, no clear obligations arise with regard to the
mitigation or remediation of space debris. This lacuna is made more
complex by the fact that to date there is no internationally accepted
definition of "space debris."5 5
Article IX builds upon Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which
reads that the "exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
52. Philippe Sands, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 382 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2003). The other two kinds of damage listed are planetary
contamination (forward and backward) and environmental damage caused to the
Earth's surface due to uncontrolled re-entry.
53. This is also the view taken by Joanne Wheeler, The Current Legal Framework
Associated with Space Debris Mitigation, 168 J. AEROSPACE ENGINEERING 911,
912 (2007).
54. G6rardine M. Goh & Bobby Kazeminejad, Mars Through the Looking Glass: An
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Forward and Backward Contamination, 20 SPACE
POL'Y 217, 219 (2004).
55. A draft definition has finally been provided by the International Law Association
("ILA") in the Annex to Resolution 5 of the Buenos Aires International Instru-
ment on the Protection of the Environment from Damage Caused by Space Deb-
ris, 66th Conference of the ILA (1994), as referenced in Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel,
The Draft of the International Law Association for a Convention on Space Debris,
38 PROC. COLLOQUIUM ON L. OF OUTER SPACE 69 (1995). The draft definition of
space debris is that it comprises "man-made objects in outer space, other than
active or otherwise useful satellites, where no change can reasonably be expected
in these conditions in the foreseeable future."
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the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of scientific or
economic development, and shall be the province of all Mankind."56
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty however, does provide a mini-
mal level of guidance with regard to the environmental protection of
outer space, obligating States Parties to be "guided by the principle of
co-operation and mutual assistance ... with due regard to the corre-
sponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty."57 Fur-
ther, Article IX stipulates that the study and exploration of outer
space should be conducted "so as to avoid... harmful contamination,"
and States Parties are to "adopt appropriate measures for this pur-
pose."58 The language of Article IX is also repeated in Article 7(1) of
the Moon Agreement. The scope of Article IX however, is restricted by
its failure to detail exactly what constitutes "harmful contamination"
or "appropriate measures," as well as the stipulation that such mea-
sures be taken only when States Parties consider "necessary." There-
fore, Article IX is not self-executing. Moreover, subsequent practice
has not been considered space debris under the classification of
"harmful contamination."59
The protection of the outer space environment through the mitiga-
tion and remediation of space debris can be considered an extension of
the "province of Mankind" principle, as well as the international obli-
gation to have "due regard"6o for other States' activities in outer
space. Indeed, the failure to mitigate or remediate any space debris
would severely endanger the rights of all other States to use and ex-
plore outer space. However, as can be seen from the wording, these
provisions are very vague and are left wide open to interpretation.
Evidence that international rule-making for space activities has
markedly moved away from treaty-making and towards informalism
is particularly clear with regards to Guidelines relating to space deb-
ris. In recent years, the mitigation and re-mediation of space debris
has received much attention from the international community of en-
gineers, scientists, technicians and jurists. As a result, this field has
witnessed a rapid evolution in informal standard-setting.
The development of standards relating to space debris received a
huge launch impetus with the establishment of the Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordination Committee ("IADC"). The IADC-an in-
tergovernmental forum comprised of various space agencies61-
56. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, at art. IX.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. This classification generally refers to forward and backward contamination by
biological or radiological sources.
60. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, at art. IX.
61. To date, member agencies of the IADC are Agenzia Spaziale Italiana ("ASI, It-
aly"), British National Space Centre ("BNSC, United Kingdom"), Centre National
d'Etudes Spatialies ("CNES, France"), China National Space Administration
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drafted Guidelines to mitigate the space debris situation. The IADC
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 62 reflect and consolidated mea-
sures undertaken by its member organizations. These IADC Mitiga-
tion Guidelines focus on the prevention of on-orbit spacecraft break-
ups, the removal of end-of-mission spacecraft and orbital stages, and
the limitation of objects released during normal space operations. 63
The space debris issue has also attracted the attention of the
"Space Systems and Operations" Subcommittee of the International
Standards Organization ("ISO") "Aircraft and Space Vehicles" Techni-
cal Committee. The Subcommittee is in the process of developing
technical implementation standards for space debris mitigation mea-
sures6 4 as the next logical step in line with the work of the IADC.
Further, a Working Group on Space Debris has also been formed
within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the U.N. Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS"). Working
against the context of the U.N. treaties on outer space, the Working
Group published the Revised Draft Space Debris Mitigation Guide-
lines,6 5 which are based on the JADC Guidelines. These Revised Draft
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines were endorsed by the COPUOS in
2007.66
Again working against the context of the IADC Guidelines, a policy
statement entitled the European Code of Conduct for Space Debris
("CNSA, China"), Deutsches Zentrum fuer Luft- und Raumfahrt ("DLR, Ger-
many"), European Space Agency ("ESA"), Indian Space Research Organization
("ISRO, India"), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency ("JAXA, Japan"), National
Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA, United States of America"), Na-
tional Space Agency of Ukraine ("NSAU, Ukraine") and Russian Federal Space
Agency ("ROSCOSMOS, Russia"). For more information, see Welcome to the In-
ter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Website, http://www.iadc-
online.org/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
62. INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE, L.DC SPACE DEBRIS
MITIGATION GUIDELINES (2007), http://www.iadc-online.orgindex.cgi?item=docs
pub.
63. Space Debris Environment Re-mediation Study Group, International Academy of
Astronautics, Study (forthcoming 2009). The present author is a member of this
Study Group, and a contributing author on legal issues of space debris re-media-
tion to this Study Group report.
64. Int'l Org. for Standardization [ISO], Space systems-Orbital Debris-Routes to
Compliance and Management for Debris Mitigation, ISC Doc. TC 20/SC 14 (forth-
coming), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/iso-catalogue/catalogue-tccatalogue-
tc browse.htm?commid=46614 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
65. Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [COPOUS], Scientific & Technical Sub-
comm., Working Group on Space Debris, Progress Report of the Working Group on
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.284 (Feb. 28, 2006).
66. Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [COPOUS], Report to the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee on its forty.fourth session, held in Vienna from 12 to 23
February 2007, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/890 (Mar. 6, 2007).
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Mitigation has been issued by the European States.6 7 This Code of
Conduct was drafted by the Network of Centres Space Debris Coordi-
nation Group, and represents the work of the European space agen-
cies since 1999. The Code of Conduct is targeted at industry partners
and other concerned public and private entities to assist in the appli-
cation of measures to reduce or prevent the build-up of space debris.
These Guidelines and Codes of Conduct, which serve as recom-
mendatory standards and policy statements, indicate the clear incli-
nation towards a "soft" regulation of space debris. As a next step, the
International Academy of Astronautics has established a Study Group
to build upon the Guidelines and Code of Conduct and draft a report
relating to the re-mediation of the space debris situation. It is only a
matter of time before Guidelines relating to the re-mediation of the
space debris situation will also be promulgated.
B. Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space
The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space ("PAROS") has
been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament ("CD") since
1985. The issue is specifically addressed in ad hoc committees, estab-
lished between 1985 and 1994. The output of these committees, in the
form of working papers, has been regularly presented to the Secretary
General and the annual plenary meetings of the CD with the aim of
plugging the gaps in the legal framework relating to the prevention of
the weaponization of outer space.
Motivation to negotiate and draft an agreement, in this regard,
gained momentum upon the 2001 unilateral withdrawal of the United
States of America from the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Bal-
listic Missile Systems ("ABM Treaty").68 Although the ABM Treaty
was a bilateral agreement between the United States of America and
the (former) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the U.S. withdrawal
was seen as a clear paradigm shift in the perspectives of one of the two
major space powers at the time.
With the demise of the ABM Treaty, the vulnerabilities of space
assets and infrastructures were brought to the forefront. Discussion
in the CD was mainly driven by China and Russia. In 2001, the same
year as the American withdrawal, China proposed a Draft Treaty on
the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space. 69 This proposal
67. U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/62/20 (July 26, 2007).
68. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May
26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435. The United States of America withdrew from the
Treaty in December 2001.
69. Conference on Disarmament, Letter Dated 5 June 2001 from the Permanent Rep-
resentative of China Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Dis-
armament Transmitting a Working Paper Entitled "Possible Elements of the
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was seconded by Russia. Russia followed this with another Draft of a
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space
in 2006.70 Momentum to negotiate and conclude a treaty increased
with the recognition by various member States of the necessity to safe-
guard the peaceful exploration of outer space.
The European States have also taken a firm interest in the issue.
The "Weapons in Space"71 report, submitted by the Assembly of West-
ern European Union ("WEU"), was unanimously adopted by the CD on
May 16, 2006. Its follow-up report, "Weapons in Space: Part II,"72 was
also unanimously adopted on May 2, 2007. Both of these reports
stated that the global space industry will be severely affected by the
"disastrous effects of space weaponization," and invited the WEU
member States, as well as member States of the European Union
("EU") and the European Space Agency to create a space surveillance
network.
All EU member States have voted in favor of the U.N. General As-
sembly Resolution 61/75 on the "Transparency and Confidence Build-
ing Measures ("TCBMs") in Outer Space Activities."73 A workshop on
the topic of "Security and Arms Control in Space and the Role of the
EU" was organized in Berlin, Germany, in June 2007. EU member
States agreed on the proposal to draft a Space Security Strategy that
would be complementary to the already-published European Space
Policy. 74 A proposal was also made for EU member States to draft a
"Code of Conduct in Space" ("CoC"), as the EU's response to the re-
quest for a "concrete proposal" by the General Assembly in its resolu-
tion 61/75.75 The aim of the CoC was to codify the "best practice"
standard of member States with regard to space activities.
Discussion on the draft CoC was taken up with the overlap of the
weaponization of outer space with civil space activities, space debris
mitigation, the European Space Policy and space traffic management
in mind. Intra-EU consultations iterated the document to produce the
"EU Food for Thought Document on a Comprehensive Code of Con-
duct for Space Objects."76 This document, in compliance with the UN
Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the Weaponization of
Outerspace", U.N. Doc. CD/1645 (June 6, 2001).
70. The Draft was provided by Russia on June 28, 2007.
71. Assembly of W. European Union, Weapons in Space, Doc. A/1932 (June 21, 2006).
72. Assembly of W. European Union, Weapons in Space: Part II, Doc. A/1966 (June 6,
2007).
73. G.A. Res. 61/75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/75 (Dec. 18, 2006); see also G.A. Res. 61/58,
U.N. Doc. (Jan. 3, 2007) (dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer
space; the E.U. member States voted unanimously for the resolution).
74. The proposal was agreed upon on May 22, 2007.
75. Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [COPOUS], Scientific & Technical Sub-
comm., Working Group on Space Debris, Progress Report of the Working Group on
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.284 para. 1 (Feb. 28, 2006).
76. Conference on Disarmament, Doc. CFSP/PRES/BER 0986/07.
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Charter, proposed that member States should commit to preventing
outer space from becoming an area of conflict, including the commit-
ment to resolve any conflict created by space activities by peaceful
means. Since the intention of the EU was to create an international
instrument, negotiations were then also held with other space-faring
States, including China, Russia and the United States.
In a non-paper, the United States reiterated its support of the ef-
forts made to preserve the environment of outer space, and to ensure
safe and responsible space operations. However, there was strong op-
position to the EU's linkage of TCBMs with the prevention of the
weaponization of outer space, or with the establishment of new legal
frameworks. 77 So as to accommodate the American perspective,
among the proposals then made by the EU was to reduce the CoC to
the level of "Best Practice Guidelines," and entirely avoid any refer-
ence to UN General Assembly Resolution 61/58.
In direct contrast, China and Russia have continued their support
of a treaty-based instrument for the prevention of the weaponization
of outer space. On February 12, 2008, China and Russia jointly sub-
mitted the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weap-
ons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space
Objects ("PPWT").78 The proposal included a move to conclude a new
international legal instrument with a clear dispute settlement and en-
forcement mechanism. The response from member States was
favorable. The EU member States were also fully in support of the
PPWT, with the caveats that definitions for the treaty had to be
agreed upon and that an effective and robust verification system
should be included as an integral part of the treaty. The EU member
States also underlined their continued work on a set of TCBMs, as
part of an incremental approach to a treaty that will gain consensus at
the CD.79
A compromise position was undertaken by the EU member States
in the revised version of the draft CoC circulated for endorsement by
April 23, 2008. This draft retains the title "Code of Conduct," and
clarifies that its objective is to codify "new best practices." The revised
draft states that compliance with the existing international agree-
ments should be promoted, including four of the five U.N. outer space
77. See OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY (2006),
http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default-file/Unclassified%20National%20Space%20
Policy%20-%20FINAL.pdf
78. Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the
Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, http://www.reachingcritical
will.org/political/cd/papers08/lsession/Febl2%2ODraft%20PPWT.pdf (last visited
Aug. 24, 2008).
79. Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switz., Jan. 23-Mar. 28, 2008, Statement
by the Representative of the Republic of Slovenia on behalf of the European Union
(Feb. 28, 2008).
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treaties (excepting the 1979 Moon Agreement), the Regulations of the
International Telecommunications Union, the Comprehensive Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation, the Principles relevant to the use of Nuclear
Power Sources in Outer Space,SO and the Declaration on International
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit
and in the Interest of all States, Taking into Particular Account the
Needs of Developing Countries.S1 Articles relating to space traffic
management, space debris control and timely registration of space ob-
jects in line with the Registration Convention8 2 and the Registration
resolution83 are also included in the revised draft. However, only the
informal dispute settlement mechanisms of consultation and investi-
gation are proposed.
IV. BEYOND THE INITIAL PANIC: INFORMALISM
AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR
SPACE LAW-PROPOSALS
The foregoing section indicates two evolving perspectives of inter-
national lawmaking in the field of space activities: the first, an initia-
tive from the technicians and engineers involved in the field; and the
second, launched by the legal and policy experts. In both cases, the
use of informalism in creating new standards of best practices and
codes of conduct is a clear break with the traditional method of formal
treaty-making between State delegations.
The many concerns of highly qualified publicists, with regard to
the negative effects of informalism and the creation of soft law, do
have much merit. The advantages involved in employing the informal
method of creating international standards may, however, outweigh
these concerns. Whatever the concerns from either camp, it is clear
that informal international regulation of space activities is being un-
dertaken in various fora with regard to various topics of contemporary
interest.
This may be a positive development. In addition to the involve-
ment of scientific and technical experts in international legal regula-
tion, informalism has been shown to provide a strong impetus for
stakeholders to ensure minimum standards in space activities, while
maintaining a flexible, progressive framework. Informalism and the
creation of soft law appear to be a workable and increasingly utilized
80. G.A. Res. 47/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992).
81. G.A. Res. 511122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51122 (Dec. 13, 1996).
82. United Nations Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, Nov. 12, 1974, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. As of January 1, 2008, fifty-one States
have ratified the Convention, four have signed it, and a further two have ac-
cepted the rights and obligations therein.
83. G.A. Res. 62/101, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/101 (Jan. 10, 2008).
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method of regulating space activities. Through the passage of U.N.
G.A. Resolutions, the drafting of recommended minimum standards
by expert practitioners and the proposal of draft codes of international
conduct, informalism is clearly the preferred method of present and
future regulation of activities in outer space.
However, legal regulation through informal means will only be a
positive development if certain rules are set. The establishment of
rules for informal rule-making may seem to be a paradox. The estab-
lishment of these rules is intended to ensure coherence and consis-
tency in standard creating, thereby guaranteeing a "hardening" of the
soft regulations created. This is especially significant insofar as in-
formalism is seen as the first step towards the development of a hard,
binding international legal framework.
The following rules are proposed for the coherent and progressive
development of regulations for space activities through informal
means:
8 4
* Non-treaty agreements should use treaty language and aim to-
wards creating detailed protocols that supplement a framework
convention.
The objective of this proposed rule is to ensure that soft law can
slowly be "hardened." International environmental law is one field in
which a framework treaty is later supplemented with detailed proto-
cols.8 5 The framework treaty provides the legal structure with basic
principles and a general aim towards future cooperation between par-
ties and also sets out the implementation and dispute settlement
mechanisms. The subsequent protocols then establish, in detail, the
specific regulations required. This allows the parties to adapt easily
to technical and scientific developments, as well as to changes in cir-
cumstances in the field. With regard to activities in outer space in
particular, this would be especially necessary to incorporate scientific
and technical know-how into the legal framework, as well as to ensure
flexibility to remain relevant in the face of rapid evolution in
technology.
* Both States and non-State actors should be given standing to ac-
cede to the agreement.
The globalization of activities, especially those relating to outer
space, brings with it a plethora of various actors that are instrumental
in ensuring the implementation of international regulation. The shift
in paradigm from the original State-centric perspective of interna-
84. For an excellent discourse on rule-making by networks of professionals, see An-
drea Bianchi, Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-State Actors, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 197 (Gunther Teubner, ed. 1997).
85. Examples of this include the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1992
Convention on Biodiversity.
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tional law must change to accommodate the various stakeholders in-
volved. Individuals, multi-national corporations, non- and inter-
governmental organizations and expert professional associations join
the traditional State actors in contributing to, and benefiting from,
space activities. Therefore, to ensure that all stakeholders and benefi-
ciaries can participate in the regulation of space activities, it is neces-
sary to widen the scope of locus standi, so as to allow these actors to
meaningfully participate in the regulatory processes of international
space law.
* Iterations of non-treaty agreements should build upon the last-
agreed text.
Soft law has had a history of being deliberately used as a tool by
non-State actors to turn the tide of international inclination when
States do not appear willing to enter into a treaty. A good example of
this is with regard to women's rights. Various experts and non-gov-
ernmental organizations drafted what would become the U.N. G.A.
Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Violence against Wo-
men in 1993. The Declaration built upon Comment No. 19 of the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and was
consistent with the Vienna Programme of Action and the Beijing Plat-
form for Action. While all four documents are technically not binding,
they successfully brought women's rights to prominence on the inter-
national level.8 6 What is significant is that these documents progres-
sively built upon the last-agreed text. This reduces the possibility of
the fragmentation of the law in that field, and also avoids duplication
of work and the resulting waste of time and resources.
V. CONCLUSION: CATCHING THE MONKEY AT
THE BLACK-TIE SOIRftE
Ambient developments in space activities have taken on the agility
and unpredictability of a monkey caught at the black-tie soir6e of in-
ternational law-making. In between the panic caused and the upset
social norms of the international legal community, it may be that the
"softly, softly" approach of informalism and non-treaty agreements is
the best way to catch that monkey. International space law is by no
means the only field of international law that is facing the challenge of
dealing with informal regulations. Indeed, informalism may be the
way forward in a time where technological, scientific and economic
evolution tends to outstrip the pace at which law is formally being
made. That said, informalism may only be useful if it manages to ad-
dress the shortcomings in its own procedures. In particular, it is es-
sential that informal law-making does not fragment the international
legal framework for the regulation of space activities. To that end, the
86. See Chinkin, supra note 5, at 31.
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proposals made in this Article may serve to further the utility of in-
formalism by addressing its disadvantages head-on. With a "softly,
softly" approach, perhaps even the monkey may be persuaded to at-
tend the soir6e in a tuxedo.
